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A One-Time Pad based Cipher for Data Protection
in Distributed Environments
Igor Sobrado
University of Oviedo
A one-time pad (OTP) based cipher to insure both data protection and integrity when mobile
code arrives to a remote host is presented. Data protection is required when a mobile agent could
retrieve confidential information that would be encrypted in untrusted nodes of the network; in this
case, information management could not rely on carrying an encryption key. Data integrity is a
prerequisite because mobile code must be protected against malicious hosts that, by counterfeiting
or removing collected data, could cover information to the server that has sent the agent. The
algorithm described in this article seems to be simple enough, so as to be easily implemented.
This scheme is based on a non-interactive protocol and allows a remote host to change its own
data on-the-fly and, at the same time, protecting information against handling by other hosts.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Architecture and Design—distributed networks, network communications; C.2.4 [Computer-
Communication Networks]: Distributed Systems—distributed applications; H.3 [Information
Systems]: Information Storage and Retrieval; H.3.4 [Information Storage and Retrieval]:
Systems and Software—distributed systems, information networks
General Terms: Information retrieval, Security, Mobile code
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Assurance, cryptographic algorithms, data integrity, data
protection, key exchange, secure distributed systems
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile agents are a promising technology that could improve performance over
the classical client/server model in distributed application scenarios [Ismail and
Hagimont 1999] and world-wide communications. It is well known that agents of-
fer important benefits in distributed environments. Amongst other things, mobile
agents reduce network load, overcome network latency, encapsulate protocols, are
executed asynchronously and autonomously, adapt dynamically, are heterogeneous
and are fault-tolerant [Lange and Oshima 1999]. Mobile agents are also used to
search for distributed information [Menczer and Belew 1998], in electronic com-
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Table 1. Operators Used in this Paper
Operator Description
a← b assignation of value stored in b to a
a = b compares the values of a and b
f ⊕ g concatenation of bit fields f and g
f & g bitwise and operation between bit fields f and g
f xor g bitwise exclusive-or operation between bit fields f and g
f ≪ n an n-bit rotation (not displacement) to the left of the bit field f
f ≫ n an n-bit rotation (not displacement) to the right of the bit field f
array[i] denotes the i-th element of the vector array[1 . . . n]
array[i] : i = 1, 2, . . . , n denotes the entire vector array[1 . . . n]
merce [Morin and Konstantas 1998; Ardissono et al. 1999; Ma 1999], network man-
agement (service reconfiguration, mobility) [Tennenhouse 1996], control [Spoon-
hower et al. 1998], monitorization, information streams automation, active networks
[Tennenhouse and Wetherall 1996] and active documents. Looking at security, mo-
bile agents have a flaw. They are vulnerable to attacks from malicious nodes and
other agents in the network. A data protection scheme developed to reduce security
risks in distributed environments will be presented in this work.
Mobile code based computing requires data management models that allow infor-
mation to be protected against both potential malicious peer hosts (remote hosts in
the network) and hostile agents that could falsify and destroy data collected by other
agents or stored in nodes in the information network. Furthermore, peer hosts and
mobile code requires code area, execution thread and data part all to be protected
against both unauthorized disclosure and modification of information and denial of
service (DoS) attacks [Fong and Cameron 1998; Neuenhofen and Thompson 1998].
In fact, comparable protection requirements should be implemented on hosts and
mobile code [Vitek and Castagna 1999]. Protection of hosts could be easily solved
using classical protection strategies like firewalls and unpermissive access control
policies; some examples are the use of access control lists (ACLs) and independent
address spaces. However security of agents require the development of new protec-
tion algorithms because information will be managed in untrusted environments.
It is known that when mobile code arrives to a remote host it can be completely
examined by the host before running. At this moment, the remote host could coun-
terfeit or erase retrieved data to hide important information to the server that has
sent the mobile code. A classical approximation to solve this problem is the use
of cryptography. In conventional cryptographic algorithms a single key is used for
both encryption and decryption. Such systems, also known as symmetric, require
the key to be stored on a safe place. Obviously, symmetric cryptosystems are not
suitable to protect information collected by mobile code if the encryption key needs
to be conveyed with mobile code. Asymmetric ciphers (public-key cryptosystems)
are a better choice to protect information against malicious hosts, but are too slow
and sometimes allow detectable patterns in a message to survive the encryption
process making the technology vulnerable to cryptanalysis. To prevent this weak-
ness, public-key ciphers should hide these patterns by standard compression of the
message before encryption [Zimmermann 1998].
For security reasons public-keys must be certified before using. Information net-
works based on public-key ciphers requires to have certification authorities (CAs)
A Cipher for Data Protection in Distributed Environments · 3
SIGNATUREMESSAGE
DATA AREA (MOBILE CODE)
LEN
(UN)ENCRYPTED
DATA FIELD
ENCRYPTED
CW MFD
REGISTER
Fig. 1. Each register in the mobile code data area contains a message field that is composed by
the message length (LEN) and data (DATA) fields. The signature includes the codeword (CW)
and the message field digest (MFD) which are those that will be used to authenticate the message.
Table 2. Classification of Keys Used
Key Length Notes
Digital signature key 128-bit Could be transmitted using an untrusted
communication channel.
Encryption key 128-bit greater Requires a secure communication
than data field size channel.
that will be used to authenticate public-keys provided by the nodes in the network.
These CAs could be hosts in the information network or external hosts shared be-
tween two or more networks. It is easy to see that encryption keys must be certified.
Suppose as an example that our organization has an information network where
mobile code retrieves data using a public-key cipher to authenticate all information
delivered. One host wants to protect the provided data using its own public, PubHi ,
and private, PriHi , keys, where Pub and Pri denotes public and private keys re-
spectively and Hi labels the i-th host in the mobile agent route. If public-keys are
not certified, any host in the information network could simulate a pair of private
and public-keys for the data provider using its own pair of private (PrifalseHi ) and
public (PubfalseHi ) keys to digitally sign messages supplying
sgn
false
i,j ← fPrifalse
Hi
(msgfalse)
instead of
sgni,j ← fPriHi (msg)
as the j-th message for the i-th host in the agent route. Here sgn stands for a
signed message and f for an encryption function. Table 1 presents a description of
the operators used in several sections of this article. In this case, the server that
has sent mobile code has no way to determine the host that really signed the data.
The same problem occurs when encryption is used. Now,
cpr
false
i,j ← fPubS
[
f
Pri
false
Hi
(msgfalse)
]
could be used by a malicious host replacing the real ciphertext (cpr) provided by
the i-th host in the route of the agent:
cpri,j ← fPubS
[
fPriHi (msg)
]
,
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where PubS denotes the public-key of the agent server. Another advantage related
with CAs is that the public-key of a CA could be used to authenticate and/or
decrypt all messages certified by that CA. As a consequence, only one public-key
is required to manage the information provided by all the hosts associated with a
particular CA.
The algorithm described in this work does not rely on a public-key cryptosystem
and only requires to establish a connection with the remote information network
hosts to acquire a copy of the one-time keys that were used to authenticate or
encrypt information collected by mobile code. In Figure 1 the structure of the
registers stored in the mobile agents data area is shown. Table 2 presents a classi-
fication of keys used by our protection algorithm, the size of these keys and some
additional notes related with keys management. This connection does not rely on
an interactive protocol between the agent and the server that has sent it. A com-
munication channel to share used keys will solely be established when mobile code
returns to the agent server. Only connections established between remote hosts
in the network and the agent server in order to share one-time encryption keys
will require a secure communication channel. When exclusively data integrity must
be assured, once mobile code has arrived to the server that has sent it, the data
management model proposed in this paper allows one-time keys to be sent, over
untrusted channels, to the server generating the mobile agent. This is because these
keys will not be used again. In any case, these keys will not be released before the
agent returns. Most mobile agent based applications only requires the protection
of a part of the mobile code data area. In particular, our information protection
scheme admits digital signature and encryption of provided data by peer hosts.
The agent data area can evolve dynamically as a consequence of visiting servers
where information is collected. The algorithm that is going to be described in this
work allows data protection in a way that prevents unauthorized modification or
disclosure of information but grants a host to change its own information1.
The way our protection scheme manages data encryption and digital signature is
one without carrying cryptographic keys and without requiring interaction between
the server which has sent the mobile code and the proper agent. It is implemented
such that only authorized hosts (the host that provides information and the server
that has sent the mobile agent) could change the retrieved data with simultaneous
protection against “brainwash”. To avoid data erasing, activity of agents will be
logged by external hosts in the network.
2. SHARING KEYS BETWEEN PEER HOSTS AND THE AGENT SERVER
A security model for mobile code should conceive protocols requiring minimal in-
teraction between the server that has sent the mobile code and the agent itself
[Sander and Tschudin 1997]. The proposed data management model does not rely
on an interactive protocol between the mobile code and the server that has sent it
and that would like to go off-line. A secure connection between remote hosts in the
network and the agent server, for example using the transport layer security (TLS)
1For security reasons a peer host could not change information provided by other nodes in the
information network.
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Mobile code is routed
through the network.
A one-time key is
generated to sign
or encrypt a message.
Mobile code returns
to the agent server.
Keys are requested
to peer hosts.
removeKeys()
Agent
server
sendMC()
Peer
host
Peer
host
sendMC()
genKey(length)
protectMsg(msg,msg     )
sendMC()
key
reqKeys()
sendKeys()
Fig. 2. Digital signature and encryption of data will require one-time keys that will be requested
to the peer hosts when mobile code returns to the agent server. Each remote host must check
its own generated keys to assure that were not used to protect another previously signed message
stored in the mobile code data area.
Table 3. Description of Functions Used in the Algorithms
Function Description
checkMsg(msg, msgkey) authentication of message msg using key msgkey
genKey(length) makes a valid (unique) one-time key of size length
length(a) returns the size of a
protectMsg(msg, msgkey) protects the message msg using the key msgkey
rand(n) creates an n-bit length random field
removeKeys() erases the generated keys from peer host data area
reqKeys(hostid) requests the generated keys applied by the peer host hostid
sendKeys(serverid) sends the generated keys to the agent server serverid
sendMC(hostid) sends the agent to the host hostid
protocol2 [Dierks and Allen 1999; Paulson 1999], will only be required to share
encryption keys. Even without using such a protocol, it is possible to implement
secure communication channels over untrusted networks with different algorithms
[Abadi et al. 1998]. If we only need to digitally sign data and not to encrypt it,
information can be sent to the server as plain-text when mobile agent returns; in
this case, keys will not be compromised because the server will have a copy of data
that could not be counterfeited by peer hosts at this moment. These keys will not
be used again to digitally sign other registers in the future. Figure 2 depicts the
communication established between the agent server and two peer hosts to route
the agent through the network, store and protect information in the data area of
an agent and retrieve the keys used. Table 3 lists a description of the functions
used in these algorithms.
2TLS is the latest revision of the secure socket layer (SSL) protocol.
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Require: keyLength 128 _ length(f
1
 f
2
 : : : f
n
) + 128
Ensure: msg
key
fa valid random one-time keyg
keyF lag  0
while keyF lag = 0 do
keyF lag  1
msg
key
 rand(keyLength)
5: for i = 1 to m do
reg
tmp
 reg[i]
if keyLength = length(reg
tmp
) + 128 _ keyLength = 128 then
if checkMsg(reg
tmp
;msg
key
) = OK then
keyF lag  0
10: end if
end if
end for
end while
Fig. 3. genKey(): Random one-time keys generation algorithm.
Require: length(msg
key
) = 128 _ length(f
1
 f
2
 : : : f
n
) + 128
Ensure: reg fprotected messageg
msg f
1
 f
2
 : : : f
n
cw rand(64) fthe codeword is a random 64-bit eldg
cw
unrotated
 cw fcodeword eld is storedg
mfd 0 fmfd eld bits are set to zerog
5: for i = 1 to n do
l
i
 cw&3Fh fl
i
is obtained from the six least signicant bits of cwg
m
i
 (cw 6) &3Fh ffrom the six most signicant bits of cwg
mfd mfd xor (f
i
 l
i
)
cw cw m
i
10: end for
reg msg  cw
unrotated
mfd
reg reg xormsg
key
Fig. 4. protectMsg(): Digital signature and data encryption algorithm.
Now, we are going to explain the propagation of keys. Each host in the network
that wants to provide some information must create a random one-time key that will
be used to digitally sign or encrypt just one message using the function genKey().
In Figure 3 appears the random one-time keys generator proposed to create valid
keys to protect new registers for a mobile agent. The one-time key created by
the host will be applied to the message using the function protectMsg(). Figure
4 provides a description of the algorithm used to protect data provided by peer
hosts to the agent. The function genKey() will assure that this key could not be
applied to other messages in the mobile code data area before accepting it. This
restriction ensures that messages signed or encrypted by remote hosts will be easily
identified. These keys will be shared with the agent server through a secure channel
when data encryption is required. When the agent is traveling in the network, keys
must not be provided to other hosts, in particular to the server that has sent it,
because information is vulnerable to attack or damage in untrusted nodes. The
protocol described in this article allows to establish a link between the agent server
and remote hosts in the network using the function reqKeys() to get copies of the
applied keys when the agent returns to the server that has dropped it. Whenever
an agent server requests the used keys to a remote host, after sending them to
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Require: length(msg
key
) = 128 _ length(f
1
 f
2
 : : : f
n
) + 128
Ensure: message authentication or decryption
reg reg xormsg
key
fmessage eld is recoveredg
for i = 1 to n do
l
i
 cw&3Fh fl
i
is obtained from the six least signicant bits of cwg
m
i
 (cw 6) &3Fh ffrom the six most signicant bits of cwg
5: mfd mfd xor (f
i
 l
i
)
cw cw m
i
end for
if mfd = 0 then
auth OK
10: else
auth FALSE
end if
Fig. 5. checkMsg(): Authentication and decryption of data algorithm.
the server, they must be removed by the generating host by using the function
removeKeys().
If we forecast that mobile agents may travel through more than one information
network in the same trip, we must assure that keys will be used only one time.
It is highly unlikely, but possible, to sign or encrypt two messages using the same
key. We could think that mobile code could verify this fact, but only if it does not
imply to carry a copy of the used keys in the mobile code data area. It is possible
to check keys generated by each peer host by trying to match it with every register
carried by the mobile code. That a random one-time key matchs a register does
not mean that we have obtained a key used by other host as it will be shown below,
but to assure security this key must be discarded. Figure 5 shows an algorithm
that could be used to authenticate and decrypt the registers stored in the mobile
agent data area using the keys created by the remote hosts. Upon the return of
the agent, these keys will be delivered to the server that owns it using the function
sendKeys().
To prevent attacks trying to discover the keys at use, previously used crypto-
graphic keys will not be applied again. Instead of using the old key a new one will
be generated to sign or encrypt a message. As commented above, each peer host
should check that its own generated cryptographic keys could not be applied to
other registers. The check will be performed by trying to apply these keys on the
registers stored in the mobile agent internal table. This condition assures that the
host that signed the data will be identified without problems by the server that
generated the agent.
3. RETRIEVING AND PROCESSING INFORMATION
At this moment we have a way to share encryption keys between remote hosts
in the information network and the agent server. As shown above, each register
provided by a peer host will be digitally signed or encrypted using a different one-
time key. These keys will be sent to the agent server after the return of the agent.
On this section we will show how to digitally sign and encrypt information provided
by remote hosts and how to authenticate information retrieved using these shared
keys.
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1
64-bit64-bit64-bit
128-bit
3
2
For digital
signature
f1 f2
DATA AREA (MOBILE CODE)
LEN
(UN)ENCRYPTED
DATA FIELD
64-bit 64-bit64-bit
XOR
mfd
ENCRYPTED
CW MFD
128-bit
fn
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len cw
Fig. 6. Digital signature and encryption of data on remote hosts is based on splitting the data
field on equal-sized blocks (64-bit blocks). These blocks, denoted as fi where i = 1, 2, . . . , n, will
be processed in ➀ using the codeword to obtain the MFD field that will authenticate the message
itself, in ➁. After that, the signature must be covered using an exclusive-or bitwise operator.
Whenever encryption is required the data field will be covered with an encryption key of the same
size than the field itself that should be added to the 128-bit digital signature key used to protect
the signature field of the register. This is shown in ➂.
3.1 Retrieving information from peer hosts
In the following subsection, we are going to describe a detailed information man-
agement in peer hosts, showing how to digitally sign and encrypt data provided by
remote hosts. A scheme to protect data against “a mobile code brainwash” based
on logging the agent route in external servers and use one-time keys will be exam-
ined too. Figure 6 is an overview of the process of digital signature and encryption
of data.
3.1.1 Digital signature and encryption of data. Remote hosts should protect data
provided by encrypting or, at least, digitally signing its own information fields before
releasing the mobile agent. As shown above, they could digitally sign its own data
with a 128-bit key or encrypt it using a cryptographic 128-bits key greater than the
data field size (as shown in Table 2). The length field (LEN) will store the data
field length. This field is needed to provide a most flexible communication protocol
supporting messages of arbitrary size. It is also needed because we have no way
to define an end-of-message code for our communication protocol if encryption is a
requeriment.
—Digital signature. Digital signature of information will protect data against han-
dling by other hosts in a safe way but allowing reading. Digital signature of
information does not permit counterfeited information to be carried by mobile
code and, as will be shown below, to remove information provided by peer hosts.
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This is because digitally signed fields can only be validated with the encryption
keys requested to the peer hosts by the agent server. It is possible because the
algorithm shown in this article uses a random 64-bit block that must be gener-
ated for each message digitally signed by a remote host. This random block is
never sent as plain-text. This random field will be called codeword (CW) along
this work. Only a host that have a copy of the used key intended to cover the
codeword and the message field digest could easily authenticate information pro-
vided by remote hosts and identify simultaneously the host that digitally signed
it. A host that does not have a copy of either the encryption key or the codeword
(therefore it could not obtain the message field digest that depends on the data
field and the codeword itself) will have 264 possible combinations that could be
valid to digitally sign the message. We have no way to know which key has been
used to protect a message.
—Data encryption. Information could be easily changed in a way that does not
permit to recover blocks of the message and/or the encryption key applied. If a
server provides predictable data this fact could not be used by a malicious host
to change the message contents. The message field digest will be obtained in
the same manner as in the process of digital signature but now the key used to
protect the register covers the data, codeword and message digest fields. This
key is nothing but the encryption key in this article and obviously will need to
be sent to the agent server by means of a secure channel. The agent server could
apply these encryption keys provided by peer hosts to the encrypted registers to
recover the original message that will be checked in the same way as the digital
signature.
Let us suppose a mobile agent returns to a peer host and needs to change some
information previously posed in the agent data area. Trying to decrypt the mes-
sages, this host can look for its own registers using the encryption keys generated
to protect the messages. This condition should be checked with the message field
digest. To prevent data erasing, remote hosts must generate a new random key to
sign the message discarding the key currently used. In other case, a brute force
attack against both the old and the new messages would be possible making the
protection algorithm vulnerable. In the case a peer host needed to remove a register
it could look for it in the same way, remove it from the mobile agent data area and
erase the key used to protect the register itself so that it will not be sent to the
agent server in the future.
A message field digest will protect each register. The algorithm proposed to
generate and hide the message field digest is easy to implement in any programming
language and is fast, allowing a peer host to process big volumes of information
quickly. Let us take a look to Figure 6. The data field must be splitted in 64-
bit blocks. The number of blocks that are needed to split a message is stored in
the message length field and will be used to determine the message length even if
encryption is requested. The field digest is set to zero and then the next algorithm
must be applied to each 64-bit block:
(1) As shown in Figure 7 the i-th 64-bit block must be rotated li bits to the left in
➀, where li is obtained from the six least significant bits of the codeword field.
The rotated field will be stored in the message field digest using an exclusive-or
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6-bit6-bit
1
f1
f1
f1 f2
f2
f2
l1
l2
2
128-bit
f1 f2
Codeword
field is
recovered
For digital
signature
mfd
mfd
2
l3
l
m1
f
fn
fn
1m l1
m2
m3
m3
n
m2
mfd
len
len
ln
ln mn
mn
mfdfn
XOR
len
For data encryption
len
cw
cw
cw
cw
cw
Fig. 7. Detailed description of digital signature and encryption processes for a message. In
this figure, li and mi, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n, are respectively the values of the six less and most
significant bits of the codeword field on each rotation. Encryption requires to overwrite the fi
fields with the 64-bit fields rotated to the left, as shown in ➀, and to apply a 128-bit key greater
than the data field size (obtained adding dotted fields to the signature) to protect information.
Codeword field itself is rotated mi bits to the right and recovered when process ends (in ➁).
bitwise operator.
(2) The codeword field itself is rotatedmi bits to the right, wheremi is provided by
the six most significant bits of the codeword. This operation over the codeword
field will assure that the rotation of the next 64-bit field, the (i + 1)-th 64-bit
block, could not be found.
After obtaining the field digest, the codeword field must be overwritten with
the unrotated codeword, as shown in ➁ making easier to check register integrity
using the same routine for both encryption (or digital signature) and decryption
(or authentication of information). At last, the codeword and the field digest will
be protected with the random one-time key (a 128-bit key for digital signature or
a key 128-bit greater than data field length for encryption) using an exclusive-or
bitwise operator hiding its contents as shown in ➂. Figure 7 shows how fields will
be rotated to generate the message digest and how this field is protected against
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agent
server
peer
host 1
peer
host 2
route
server
cw
mfd
one-time key
cw
mfd
one-time key
mfd
one-time key
cw
peerpeer
host
host n
i
peer
peer
host   +1i
host   +2i
1
n
n
1
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1
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1
Fig. 8. One or more route servers will provide a way to log the mobile agent route to avoid data
covering. If a route is not registered by an external server, a malicious host (in our example the
i-th peer host in the route of the agent) might overwrite the data area of the mobile agent with a
bitcopy of an old data area when the agent returns then hidding information delivered by hosts
i+ 1, i+ 2, . . .
reading by unauthorized hosts. The digital signature and encryption algorithm
presented in this article is really quick and effective with respect to computational
requirements.
3.1.2 Preventing a mobile code’s brainwash. Information provided by peer hosts
must be protected against both counterfeit and erasing. The former could be
avoided using digital signature or data encryption techniques as described above.
The latter requires a way to log agent activities in the network. Obviously, this
information could not be conveyed with the mobile agent because we cannot protect
it against unauthorized modification. Should a mobile agent return to a malicious
host, both data and log areas could be overwritten with a bitcopy of old data and
log areas carried by the agent covering information provided since it was released
for the first time by the hostile host. To workaround this problem, we propose to
store this information in one or more remote route servers (RSs). Figure 8 shows
how RSs could be used to log the routes followed by agents. This information
could be sent to these servers over untrusted communication channels without risk.
These servers will provide the route followed by each agent to the agent servers
upon requested.
In our propousal, a host could delete its own information. As described above, in
the case a peer host needed to remove some information previously provided to a
mobile agent it would be able to erase the message field that must be eliminated and
the one-time key used to protect the message itself simultaneously. This procedure
will assure that the old one-time key will not be sent to the agent server in the
future. If the agent server receives a key that could not be applied to a message
stored in the mobile agent data area, the information provided by that agent could
not be authenticated and then the ported data should be discarded.
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3.2 Authentication and decryption of data in the agent server
When a mobile agent returns to the server that has sent it, information coming
from remote hosts must be authenticated and, if it was protected against reading
by other hosts, decrypted. This server will request to the RSs the agent route
information and, after that, the keys used by the peer hosts. The agent server must
try to apply all the cryptographic keys provided by the peer hosts to the registers
collected by the mobile agent in order to try to identify the hosts that have signed
the registers. As we have shown above, these cryptographic keys were generated in
peer hosts and were not provided to other hosts in the network. As a consequence,
they are supposed not to be compromised (we are not talking about malicious
people administrating these hosts). When the agent arrives to the server that has
dropped it, keys could be requested over untrusted communication channels3 since
the server that has sent the mobile agent already have a copy of the data provided
by peer hosts and these keys will not be re-used. Only the right key will match
the message field digest and will decrypt the information if needed. This event can
be easily checked using the algorithm depicted in Figure 5. This analysis must be
applied to all the registers found on the data area.
The scheme described in this article allows a mobile agent to return to a remote
host an unlimited number of times even if it is a malicious one. A security related
restriction imposed by the algorithm described is that a host can only change its
own registers. It is easy to see that in any other case it is not possible to assure
data integrity.
4. SECURITY OF THE COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
Mobile agents and peer hosts require to be protected against attacks from other
agents and hosts in the network. In this section we will study the security of
the communication protocol against brute force attacks and spoofing techniques
intending to supplant a host identity.
4.1 Protection against off-line guessing
All strong password mechanisms proposed in the literature employ public-key tech-
niques. The possibility of develop a symmetric cipher safe to brute force attacks
has been posed in [Halevi and Krawczyk 1999]. Our protection strategy is immune
to off-line guessing. If encryption is requested, security of the protocol depends on
the security of the communication channel used to share the symmetric one-time
encryption keys and the security of the remote hosts that store the keys.
Proposition 1. A cryptosystem whose encryption key has the same length as
the message to protect is invulnerable against off-line guessing attacks if we have a
way to generate a perfect random one-time encryption key.
Proof. Suppose we have an n-bit length message and a perfect (non predictable)
random encryption key with the same length. It is easy to see that we can establish
a bijective relation between the bits of the message and the bits of the key. Let us
suppose that the i-th bit of the encryption key could change the state of the i-th
3Obviously, only if data encryption was not mandatory.
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bit of the message; as a result, there are no statistical methods that any potential
attacker could hope to use to infer detectable patterns in the message and that
could allow the prediction of the final state of the bits in the message from the
ciphertext, what is a simple consequence of Information Theory.
It is worth to remark that unpredictable encryption keys are needed. A pre-
dictable (or at least partially predictable) encryption key will allow statistical at-
tacks against the ciphertext trying to discover parts of the information provided.
Good random generators have been proposed in the bibliography [Press et al. 1995].
Next proposition assures that registers are off-line guessing resistant.
Proposition 2. For any given ciphertext c[i] : i = 1, 2, . . . , n we can found an
encryption key b[j] : j = 1, 2, . . . , n that allows to hide an arbitrary message of the
same length a[k] : k = 1, 2, . . . , n using the cipher described in this work.
Proof. We have an n-bit length ciphertext c[i] : i = 1, 2, . . . , n obtained us-
ing an exclusive-or bitwise operator as described in subsection 3.1.1 (here c[i] =
a[i] xor b[i] : i = 1, 2, . . . , n where a[i] denotes the i-th bit of the message and b[i]
labels the i-th bit of the encryption key). It is possible to hide an arbitrary message
a[i] : i = 1, 2, . . . , n if we define the key as:
b[i] =
{
0 if a[i] = c[i]
1 otherwise
where i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
It is easy to see that off-line guessing could not be applied against digital sig-
natures and encrypted data fields because we cannot determine, using brute force
attacks, what key has been applied to digitally sign the message.
Proposition 3. For any given message we can obtain 264 possible digital sig-
natures. By using brute force attacks based techniques, we have no way to know
what key has been applied.
Proof. Suppose we have a ciphertext c[i] : i = 1, 2, . . . , 128 provided with the
message as digital signature. These ciphertext hides a codeword (a random bitmap)
cw[i] : i = 1, 2, . . . , 64 and a message field digest mfd[i] : i = 1, 2, . . . , 64 that
depends on the codeword itself. It is easy to see that we have 264 possible codewords
and a message field digest for each codeword field. Applying proposition 2 we can
find a key for each pair (cw,mfd) that allows us to obtain the ciphertext c.
As a consequence, we conclude that off-line guessing based attacks against data
protected using the algorithm described are not possible when digital signature of
data is applied. If encryption of data is required, security depends on both classes
of hosts (peer hosts and the agent server) and the communication channel used to
provide copies of the encryption keys managed by the agent server.
4.2 IP-spoofing attacks
The current IP protocol technology (IPv4) does not allow to eliminate IP-spoofed
packets in the network. We are currently working in an IPv6-based protection
scheme that will offer a better solution to this problem and will be presented else-
where. To install filtering routers has been proposed as the best protection practice
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in [CERT 1996] but there is not a generally accepted solution to this threat yet.
However for the seek of completeness a strategy based on filtering routers could be
implemented as follows:
—input filters. An input filter is a filtering router that will restrict the input to
the external interface of the route server. This filter must block each package
that has a source address belonging to the internal network but comming from
outside eliminating in this way the possibility of superseding the identity of a
internal host in the network.
—output filters. An output filter is a filtering router that will refuse all packages
coming from inside and with an external source address avoiding then IP-spoofing
attacks that could be originated from any host of the subnet.
Obviously filtering routers will work only when the network where hosts that pro-
vide information are placed is physically isolated from the external network. We
should not assume that the peer hosts where agents will collect information are
all in the same physical subnet. Neither can we assume that all remote hosts are
trusted. In fact, we cannot protect hosts against spoofing techniques using filtering
routers because the hosts receiving the mobile agent could be spreaded over the
whole network. It is the mobility of the agent what breaks down the difference be-
tween internal and external. Internet Protocol version 6 includes aditional security
features useful to protect mobile agents. It is then natural to implement in this
context good anti-spoofing techniques based on authenticating the IP headers.
5. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Security risks must be considered on the design of information networks based on
mobile code. As noted by Neuenhofen and Thompson, mobile agents are extremely
vulnerable to all kinds of attacks from potentially malicious peer hosts and agents
once it leaves the agent server. Weaknesses related with remote hosts and code
protection (for example, host protection against unauthorized accesses and DoS
attacks, host authentication and code protection against modification) will not be
treated here because are out of the scope of this work and have been extensively
considered in the bibliography [Hohl 1997; Sander and Tschudin 1998]. In this
section well known security risks related with data protection in mobile agents will
be studied.
5.1 Security weaknesses in mobile agents environments
Security weaknesses related with mobile computing has been extensively considered
in the bibliography. As mentioned above, one of the main problems here is that
of agents which will be executed in untrusted nodes. These hosts will have full
access to code and data areas of the agent (and to the execution thread in mobile
code too). Security risks related with classical computing environments like off-line
guessing attacks against the ciphertext are also present. Some of these weaknesses
can be itemized as:
Attacks by hosts in the route of an agent. Some protection schemes proposed in
the bibliography [Yee 1999] rely on carrying keys that will be used to obtain partial
result authentication codes (PRACs). After using them, these keys will be destroyed
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(simple MAC4-based PRACs) or changed by means of one-way functions (MAC-
based PRACs with one-way functions). In his work, Bennet S. Yee explains that
the former could be easily attacked copying un-removed keys making vulnerable
any host sj : i < j < n, where si is the malicious host and sn is the last peer
host in the mobile code route. The latter is based on calculating, when mobile
code is going from host si to host si+1, the key ki+1 = f(ki) where f is a one-way
function. A malicious host si could get the key ki and obtain ki+1 = f(ki), ki+2 =
f(ki+1), . . . , kn = f(kn−1) turning vulnerable the hosts si+1, si+2, . . . , sn. Publicly
verifiable PRACs allow an agent itself to check the partial results obtained allowing
computations that depend on previous partial results trying to detect any integrity
violation of those results. This can be achieved without arriving at the server that
has sent it.
Off-line guessing. As described above, symmetric ciphers require the keys to be
stored in a safe place. In this case, keys must not be safely sent over untrusted
channels. Asymmetric ciphers allow public-keys to be sent over untrusted commu-
nication channels but exposing detectable patterns in a message that survive the
encryption process making these public-key based ciphers vulnerable to cryptanaly-
sis whenever the message is not compressed before encryption. Both symmetric and
asymmetric ciphers are vulnerable to off-line guessing (brute force attacks against
the ciphertext).
Data erasing. All protection schemes applied to mobile agents allow information
to be protected against counterfeit. These algorithms could be used to avoid data
handling by non-authorized hosts in the network in the sense that information
could not be modified, but sometimes they allow information to be partially or
fully removed from the data area of the agent.
5.2 How our system solves these weaknesses
Our goal is to protect the registers in the data area for both agents and mobile code
against counterfeit and erasing in a way that will be transparent to final users. The
protection of the code area and the execution thread, if present, is beyond the
scope of this article. Exhaustive works dwelling on security concepts in mobile
agents have been developed during the last years [Hohl 1997; Sander and Tschudin
1997; Vitek and Castagna 1999]. These works are mainly devoted to protect the
code area of mobile agents but not the data area that, as we mentioned above, will
evolve dinamically when mobile agents travel over the network.
Attacks by hosts in the route of an agent. The protection scheme proposed in
this work does not require the keys to be sent with the mobile code. Instead of this,
each host will generate a random one-time key for digital signature or encryption
of data. These keys will not be carried in the mobile code data area and will not be
provided to other hosts. Consequently, an agent can return to a previously visited
peer host, including malicious hosts, safely. A remote host can not change data
provided by any other host without invalidate the register carried by the mobile
code. As we have extensively described, a mobile agent data area “brainwash” is
not possible because the routes followed by agents will be registered by the RSs.
Off-line guessing. Some problems related with off-line guessing could not be
4MAC stands for message authentication code.
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avoided. If encryption is required, one-time keys used to protect data must be
transmitted over secure channels; as a result, data security depends on channel
security. Digital signature does not require keys to be transmitted using secure
channels. As we already noted, keys will not be stored as a part of the agent data
state and will then not be delivered to the agent server before the agent returns.
We have already shown that keys could not be guessed using brute force attacks.
Data erasing. A possible workaround could be to store information about the
hosts visited in remote RSs instead of in the mobile agent data area. Each host
that wants to provide information to the agent could protect itself sending its own
network address to the RSs proposed by the agent server. Each host in the network
could extract this information from the agent code area. Redundant information
could eventually be sent to the agent server when keys are requested and could also
be used to rebuild the route followed by the agent.
6. OTHER ADVANTAGES OF THE ALGORITHM
The protection algorithms applied to agents must satisfy the restrictions imposed
by mobile agent based systems. A minimal interaction between the agent server
and the agent itself is one of this restrictions. Each host that provides information
must be able to modify or remove its own registers without invalidate the agents.
Non-interactive protocol. The proposed data protection algorithm is based on
a non-interactive protocol between the agent server and the mobile code. As a
consequence, the server that has sent an agent have the possibility of going off-line.
This is one of the main goals of a mobile code based system. So, the use of a
non-interactive protocol reduces bandwidth requirements.
Keys do not need to be carried together with the mobile agent. Our algorithm
does not require keys to be carried with agents, but allows peer hosts to generate
its own random one-time keys in a way that assures that they are completely new
keys. It is important to notice that this does not mean that a brute force attack
against ciphertext trying to discover used keys is possible. One might think that the
freedom of a host to generate lots of keys could be a way of guessing and checking
actually used keys but anyone of these would be one over 264 possible choices. The
only possibility the host has is that of being very lucky picking with a single trial
the correct one among such a big set. The root of this indeterminacy is the fact
that underneath of the 128-bit signature there is a random field we have called
codeword and that affects to the message digest.
Information could be changed. This algorithm is such that information provided
by peer hosts could be changed when needed by the host that has generated it.
It is interesting to compare our proposal with that of Tschudin’s [Tschudin 1999]
that consists in appropiately linking an information with any other one coming
from other hosts to accomplish that a malicious host will not be able to remove
the signed data. This is because it can not forge the signatures of the other hosts.
There is here an advantage in the sense that, in principle, RSs are not needed. But
there is a clear inconvenience because in the best case we can finally find ourselves
with a message containing a lot of obsolete information that could not be removed
by its owner.
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7. RELATED WORK
Strong foundation is a requirement for future work in the topic of mobile agents
[Kendall et al. 1998]. To design semantics and type-safety languages for agents
in untrusted networks [Riely and Hennessy 1999] and supporting permissions lan-
guages for specifying distributed processes in dynamically evolving networks, as the
languages derived from the pi-calculus [Riely and Hennessy 1998] are important to
protect hosts against malicious code. Spoonhower et al. have shown that agents
could be used for collaborative applications reducing network bandwidth requer-
iments. Sander and Tschudin have proposed a way to obtain code privacy using
non-interactive evaluation of encrypted functions (EEF). Hohl has proposed the
possibility of use algorithms to “mess up” code.
We are currently developing a public-key based cipher that will solve this problem
using standard cryptographic tools but at a higher computational cost. The main
advantage of this algorithm will be that it would avoid the need to wait for a network
link to share a cryptographic key because all hosts in the information network and
the server that has sent the mobile code would get copies of public-keys from a key
server. These keys could be certified by a CA. We are working on a key propagation
algorithm that will make easier to share public-keys in distributed environments.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Mobile and distributed computing requires new security schemes that do not depend
on carrying cryptographic keys. During the past, information security was based
on symmetric ciphers because cryptographic keys were stored in servers accessible
only through firewalls and control access procedures. However, data management
models are changing quickly. Agent based computing is fundamental in networking
environments and, as shown before, cannot be based on classical protection schemes.
Our encryption method, as other cryptographic algorithms, obeys the following
requeriments:
—It is not needed to hide the algorithm nor the digital signature keys, only the
encryption keys must be protected against reading by unauthorized hosts;
—The encryption process must destroy statistical parameters and the structure and
predictable patterns in the language;
—An error in the transmission should not destroy the rest of the information pro-
vided but, obviously, will invalidate the message digest.
The data management model shown in this article allows data signature and
encryption in a way that only authorized hosts (the server that has sent mobile code
and the host that provides information) could modify and certificate information
retrieved then, at the same time, protecting data against “mobile code brainwash”
by malicious hosts. The cryptographic algorithm described is faster and easier to
implement on mobile code environments than public-key based ciphers that have a
higher computational cost. Other important property of this algorithm is that it
does not allow brute force attacks against the ciphertext.
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